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/"Ylthough the past decade produced
the longest peacetime economic expan-
sion since World War II, the 1980s also
generated the greatest number of com-
mercial bank failures since the Great
Depression. More than 200 banks failed
each year from 1987 through 1989, and
the average annual failure rate for the
decade was almost nine times the aver-
age annual level between 1934 and
1979. To place these two conflicting
trends in perspective, more than 24
times as many banks failed in this
expansion as failed during the upswing
of the 1960s, which until now was the
longest sustained postwar expansion
(see figure 1).
At this point, there appears to be no
relief in sight. More than 100 banks
failed in the first half of this year, and
with regulators classifying nearly 10
percent of all banks as problem institu-
tions, failures are expected to average
150 to 200 per year for the next several
years. Recent commercial real estate
difficulties, especially in the Northeast
and Southwest, will likely add to the
number of problem and failed banks in
the 1990s.
3
Why are bank failures hitting record rates
during good economic times? There are
two probable causes. First, the U.S. bank-
ing system is a regional system. Eco-
nomic slumps in specific areas of the
country, which do not necessarily coin-
cide with national downturns, may be
partly responsible for the upsurge.
Second, the rise in the failure rate may
be traced to the behavior of bank
management in increasingly dereg-
ulated and competitive financial
markets. This Economic Commentary
investigates the role each of these factors
may have played in the failures of banks
between 1982 and 1989. We conclude
that while regional economic problems
contributed to the demise of many of the
banks during this period, a bank's ability
to survive is ultimately determined by
managerial factors.
• Regional Influences
The historical preference for geographi-
cally limited banking in this country
has resulted in a fragmented regional
banking structure at the national level,
which ties bank performance more
closely to the regional rather than the
national economy. This occurs because
branching restrictions at the national
and sometimes the state level limit
where banks can locate their offices.
This, in turn, limits the geographic
diversification of a bank's portfolio, as
the majority of the bank's loans are
made in areas where it has a physical
presence; consequently, the quality of
these loans is heavily dependent on the
fortunes of the region. It is no accident
that bank failures in the 1980s were
concentrated in states that experienced
downturns in important economic sec-
tors, such as oil, agriculture, and real
estate.
Banks failed at record rates during
the past decade, and no relief appears
to be in sight. This article examines
the contributions of economic and
managerial factors to the highest
bank failure rate since the Great
Depression.
During the early part of the decade,
problems in agriculture seemed to be
driving bank failures. As seen in figure
2, banks classified as agricultural (with
more than 25 percent of their loans in
this sector) accounted for a large per-
centage of the failures in the mid-1980s.
The percentage of failed banks that
were categorized as agricultural rose
from 30 percent in 1984 to a peak of
almost 55 percent in 1985. Between
1986 and 1989, however, that ratio fell
from 41 percent to less than 8 percent, a
drop-off that can be traced to two fac-
tors. First, the agricultural sector bot-
tomed out and began to recover in the
latter half of the decade, which resulted
in a decline in the total number of
agricultural banks failing after 1985.
Second, total bank failures swelled
dramatically in the last half of the
1980s as the downturn in the real estate
market in the Southwest and the West
added to the economic woes of regions
already depressed by the deterioration
of the energy-producing sector.
ISSN 0428-1276As table 1 shows, the states experienc-
ing the most bank failures between
1982 and 1989 were Texas, with 368,
and Oklahoma, with 109. Texas alone
accounted for 35 percent of all failed
commercial banks insured by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(FDIC). The seriousness of the finan-
cial problems in the Southwest is
illustrated by the demise of seven of
the eight largest banks in Texas and
two of the largest banks in Oklahoma.
Furthermore, the southern region of the
nation comprising Texas, Oklahoma,
Louisiana, and Arkansas—an area
heavily dependent on its energy-
producing and agricultural sectors—
was responsible for more than 50 per-
cent of all commercial bank failures
from 1982 through 1989. The North
Central region, made up of the agricul-
turally important states of Minnesota,
Iowa, Missouri, the Dakotas, Nebraska,
and Kansas, accounted for 20 percent
of all bank failures during this same
period."
To investigate further the relationship
between regional economic activity
and bank failures, we compare meas-
ures of statewide economic perform-
ance for banks that failed between
1982 and 1989 with those for banks
that did not fail. Our measures of local
economic health are year-to-year per-
cent changes in personal income
(CPINC) and Dun and Bradstreet's
small-business failure rate (BFAILR)
for the state in which the bank's main
office is located, as shown in table 2.
Banks that failed between 1982 and
1989 tend to be in states with smaller
increases in personal income than the
banks in our nonfailed sample.
Likewise, failed banks tend to be
located in states with higher small-
business failure rates than those of the
nonfailed banks. Both of these differ-
ences hold when we look at data six to
12 months and 42 to 48 months before
a bank's failure date. In addition, we
find a significant positive relationship
between the number of bank failures
and business failures in a state and a sig-
nificant negative relationship between
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FIGURE 2 U.S. AGRICULTURAL BANK FAILURES
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growth in state-level personal income
and the number of bank failures in the
state.
6 Therefore, the strength of the
local economy as measured by growth
in personal income and by business con-
ditions has a direct influence on the
health of the state's banking sector.
• Managerial Determinants
While regional economic performance
clearly affects the health of the finan-
cial sector, it does not fully explain
why some banks fail. For example, the
Midwest endured a severe economic
downturn in the late 1970s and early
1980s without a large rise in bank fail-
ures. In addition, even in states like
Texas, where bank failure rates are
high, the majority of banks did not fail
in the past decade. In other words, the
ultimate determinant of whether or not
a bank fails is the ability of its manage-
ment to operate the institution effi-
ciently and to evaluate and manage risk.
One of the most important managerial
decision variables is the bank's capital.
Capital is the cushion against unex-
pected losses and is directly related to
the bank's ability to survive downturns
in the economy. Capital adequacy is
typically measured as the ratio of a
bank's book-equity capital plus the
reserve for loan losses to total assets.
Table 2 shows that 42 to 48 months
before failure, the measure of capital
adequacy (CAPTA) is higher on
average for the failed banks than for the
nonfailed sample. However, six to 12
months before failure, banks that failed
had significantly less capital per dollar
of assets than those banks in the non-
failed sample. The change in the rela-
tive capital adequacy of the failed and
nonfailed samples as the failure date
approaches is primarily due to a
deterioration of the capital adequacy
measure for the failed sample. One
explanation for the counterintuitive
results in the longer time-to-failure
sample is that the capital of failed banks
was eroded over time as their regional
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TABLE 2 RISK MEASURES AND STATEWIDE ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE IN FAILED AND NONFAILED BANKS, 1982-1989



































































CAPTA = Capital adequacy: ratio of book equity plus the reserve for loan losses to total assets.
NPLTA = Ratio of nonperforming loans to total assets.
LOANTA = Ratio of loans to total assets.
NCLNG = Ratio of net charge-offs to total loans.
OVRHDTA = Overhead as a percent of total assets.
INSIDELN = Loans to insiders as a percent of total assets.
LIQ = Liquidity: ratio of nondeposit liabilities to liquid assets.
CPINC = Percent change in state-level personal income.
BFAILR = Dun and Bradstreet's state-level personal small business failure rate per 10,000 firms.
a. A t-test indicates that the differences in the means are significant at the 1 percent level.
NOTE: A chi-square test indicates that collectively the variables are significantly different at the 1 percent
level between the failed and nonfailed samples in each time period.
SOURCE: Authors' calculations.
Also critical in determining bank-failure
outcomes is the ability of management
to evaluate and control credit or default
risk in the bank's asset portfolio. In both
sample periods shown in table 2, failed
banks had a significantly higher ratio of
loans to assets (LOANTA), a signifi-
cantly higher ratio of nonperforming or
bad loans to total assets (NPLTA), and a
higher level of losses per dollar of loans
(NCLNG). In other words, banks that
failed tended to hold riskier portfolios
with higher default rates and losses
than institutions in the nonfailed
sample. Note that although adverse
regional economic conditions may lead
to a higher level of nonperforming
loans and net losses on the loan port-
folio, they cannot explain the higher
percentage of loans held by the banks
that failed.
A second type of risk that bank man-
agers must evaluate and monitor is
liquidity risk, which arises because the
bank issues short-term liquid liabilities
to fund longer-term loans that are less
liquid. The less liquid a bank, the
greater the chance it will not be able to
meet unforeseen deposit outflows. We
measure liquidity risk (LIQ) as the
ratio of nondeposit liabilities to cash
and investment securities. This variable
is inversely related to the liquidity of
the bank. As expected, banks that
failed held less-liquid portfolios than
the nonfailed banks in both time
periods (although the difference is not
significant in the six- to 12-month
period before failure). Therefore, banks
that expose themselves to more liquid-
ity risk are more likely to fail than ones
that are relatively less exposed.
A third factor in the ability of a bank to
survive is its efficiency. More-efficient
banks are better able to withstand
adverse economic conditions and to
survive in increasingly competitive
financial markets. They also should be
able to operate with fewer fixed assets:
the more efficient the bank, the lower
overhead as a percentage of assets
(OVRHDTA) should be. As expected,
banks in the failed sample had signifi-
cantly higher overhead expense per
dollar of assets in both sample periods.
Finally, fraud and insider abuse are a
major cause of bank failures.
7 For
instance, Graham and Horner find that
in 35 percent of the failures of nation-
ally chartered banks from 1980 to
1987, insider abuse or criminal fraud
was present to some degree. The rea-
soning is as follows: even if an inside
loan is not fraudulent by nature, it can-
not be made with the same objective
standards as other loans because the
loan officer's evaluation of the bor-
rower's creditworthiness is clouded by
the "inside" relationship. Table 2
shows that, on average, failed banks
made three times as many loans to
insiders (INSIDELN) as did those in
the nonfailed sample.• Conclusion
Why have bank failures hit post-
Depression highs in the 1980s? Two
reasons are probable. First, compared
with earlier economic expansions, local
economic performance was uneven
during the decade, as regions heavily
dependent on energy and agriculture
experienced severe problems. Banks in
these regions were particularly hard hit
because the geographic diversification
of their portfolios was artificially
limited by branching restrictions at the
national and sometimes even the state
level. Second, as banking markets have
become less regulated and more com-
petitive, lending margins have shrunk
and the task of managing banks' risk
exposure has become more complex
and difficult. Two decades ago, bank
managers were faced primarily with
managing credit risk. In the 1980s,
however, they also had to contend with
new sources of risk arising from
deregulated deposit markets and from a
more volatile interest-rate environment.
Indeed, the banking industry faces a
new era of greater uncertainty under
deregulation. As increased competition
continues to weed out marginal banks,
it is likely that the number of bank
failures will remain historically high
during the 1990s.
• Footnotes
1. We define a failed bank as any bank that
is closed, is merged with assistance, or
requires federal assistance to remain open.
For a discussion of options for handling these
situations, see Daria B. Caliguire and James
B. Thomson, "FDIC Policies for Dealing
with Failed and Troubled Institutions,"
Economic Commentary, Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland, October 1, 1987.
2. Even though the bank failure rate in the
1980s is high by historical standards, it is
still low relative to the failure rate for general
businesses. For example, the 145 bank
failures in 1986 represent an annual failure
rate of 1 percent, much lower than the 8.7
percent annual failure rate for general busi-
nesses in 1986.
3. The increase in bank failures in the 1980s
was accompanied by an increase in the cost
of resolving those failures. For banks failing
in 1985 and 1986, failure-resolution cost
estimates averaged 33 percent of failed bank
assets, and the loss to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has been
estimated at as much as 64 percent of banks'
assets. See John F. Bovenzi and Arthur J.
Murton, "Resolution Costs of Bank Fail-
ures," FDIC Banking Review, vol. 1 (Fall
1988), pp. 1-13.
4. The large banks in this region that were
either closed and sold with FDIC assistance
or that required a capital infusion from the
FDIC to remain open include BancTexas,
First City Bancorporation of Dallas, First
RepublicBank Corporation of Dallas, MCorp,
Texas American Bankshares, National Bank
of Texas, First Oklahoma, and National Bank
of Oklahoma. In addition, both Texas Com-
merce Bankshares and Allied Bankshares had
to seek merger partners to stave off insol-
vency in the 1980s.
5. See Dun and Bradstreet's Business
Failure Record for a listing of its nine
regions.
6. The Spearman rank-order correlation
coefficient between the number of failures in
a state and BFAILR is 0.18431 and 0.35537
for the 42- to 48-month and the six- to 12-
month samples, respectively. The correlation
between the number of bank failures and
CPINC is -0.11473 and -0.25991 for the 42-
to 48-month and the six- to 12-month
samples, respectively. All of the correlations
have the expected sign and are significantly
different from zero at the 1 percent level.
7. An insider is anyone with a fiduciary
responsibility to the bank and includes the
friends and relatives of bank officers and
directors.
8. See Fred C. Graham and James E.
Horner, "Bank Failure: An Evaluation of the
Factors Contributing to the Failure of Nation-
al Banks," in The Financial Sen'ices Indus-
try in the Year 2000: Risk and Efficiency,
Proceedings from a Conference on Bank
Structure and Competition, Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago (May 1988), pp. 405-435.
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